The American-North Korean talks halted by the death of Kim Il Sung were resumed on August 5, 1994. As a result, the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was signed on October 21. The four main points are as follows:

　Based on this Agreed Framework, North Korea announced on November 18, 1994 that it had taken measures to fully freeze all of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. The IAEA confirmed this on November 28, 1994. However, North Korea was already making strong objections to the acceptance of South Korean LWRs at the American-North Korean expert meeting in Beijing on November 30, 1994.

　　Despite this Agreed Framework, Kim Jong Il secretly continued the nuclear program because he still felt that nuclear weapons were necessary to maintain his regime. He wanted nuclear arms not to oppose the U.S., but as deterrence against Chinese aggression. China had repeatedly pressured Kim Jong Il to end the nuclear program. He traveled to Beijing in April 2004 to explain his situation and declare that he would continue nuclear development. On his way back a major explosion – with power equivalent to 800 tons of TNT – occurred at Ryongchon Station in North Korea, just beyond the border with China. The accepted explanation from North Korea is that a freight train carrying ammonium nitrate fertilizer and petroleum crashed into a utility pole, which fell over and leaked electricity, setting off a huge explosion, but this is inconsistent with the facts. Photographs posted on the Internet right after the explosion showed a V-shaped scar reaching 15 meters below ground. This hole was clearly made by underground explosives, since aboveground explosions make U-shaped holes. The only possible explanation is that the train was blown up with huge amounts of explosives buried underground to assassinate Kim Jong Il passing through Ryongchon Station from Beijing to Pyongyang. Many photographs of the hole were searchable online directly after the accident, but they were quickly removed one after another and are mostly gone today.
　A DailyNK article from September 8, 2011, entitled, “Kim Jong Il’s Deeply Meaningful Reference to the Ryongchon Station Explosion,” read as follows:

　Kim Young Sam (who strongly opposed Clinton’s precise strike plan on North Korea in 1994) invited me to his home in August 2002 and June 2009, and we have been friendly since. He resisted the American attack on North Korea because he believed that Seoul would be struck in retaliation, leaving around one million people wounded or dead. However, he said this was a mistake. If the North Korean nuclear program had been stopped in 1994, it would not have developed today’s more advanced nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Russia is also a player in the background to North Korea’s obstinate stance of today. So what should be done? When asked by a reporter about the possibility of a military strike on North Korea, President Donald J. Trump replied, “You’ll see.” I think Trump may have judged that North Korea has already crossed his “red line,” and I think he will eventually make an advance announcement before carrying out a limited air strike on that country.
　North Korea has maintained its regime up until now because it functioned as a buffer zone for of course the U.S., but also for China and Russia. This is because, if a pro-Chinese government came into power in North Korea, the U.S. Armed Forces would be in direct confrontation with the People’s Liberation Army at the Military Demarcation Line. On the other hand, if Korean reunification was spearheaded by South Korea and the U.S., China would be in contact with the American forces at the North Korean border. We can likely say the same about the border between Russia and North Korea. Regarding the recent hydrogen bomb test and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that can reach Guam, Kim Jong Un should have said, “We have now completed our atomic bombs and miniaturized ballistic missile heads, and we will start deploying them for combat. We will conduct no further nuclear or ballistic missile launch tests as they are unneeded.” But because he declared that North Korea would rapidly conduct further tests including missiles with multiple warheads, he ended up crossing Trump’s red line. I think Trump has decided to conduct air strikes because he sensed that these statements also changed the attitude of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has previously supported North Korea.
　Trump’s announcement of a limited strike should be presupposed on allowing the continuation of the current North Korea government, not on trying to kill Kim Jong Un. If North Korea does not declare its intention to cease ICBM launches and nuclear bomb tests, Trump should make an official announcement that the U.S. will strike roughly 100 important locations at ICMB- and nuclear bomb-related facilities, including how long the strike will last. He should tell people to evacuate from these locations, and also have American and other foreign tourists, American residents, and other persons evacuated from Seoul. Next, the U.S. should destroy North Korea’s underground facilities via an air strike with cruise missiles, B-1 bombers, and bunker-buster bombs. North Korea has 300 to 500 300mm self-propelled, multiple rocket launchers and more than 10,000 long-range guns stationed along the Military Demarcation Line. To prevent retaliation using these weapons, if even one shot is made at Seoul, the U.S. should announce that it will blow up and destroy all aboveground North Korean artillery facilities at the Military Demarcation Line with a daisy cutter on the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), which has the largest destructive capability after a nuclear weapon. Some people may worry about North Korea firing its nuclear weapons, but these actions would definitely not lead to war since North Korea has nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of defending itself and intimidating non-nuclear states. The American nuclear force is over 10,000 times greater than North Korea’s at present, and if North Korea actually used a nuclear weapon it would be certainly answered with a devastating nuclear counterattack. It is improbable that Kim Jong Un, whose main priority is prolonging his own life, would launch nuclear weapons. The possibility of North Korean ground troops using underground tunnels and other means to invade South Korea is also extremely low considering the threat of bombs for destroying underground facilities. It is possible that an incident might occur like the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan on March 26, 2010. This South Korean patrol boat was hit with a torpedo from a submarine, thought to be North Korean, near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea west of the Korean Peninsula.

　I can’t deny the feeling that it seems too late to do anything, but the situation will worsen even further if Trump doesn’t forcibly make an end to the Korean Peninsula crisis with an announcement about a limited air strike now. North Korea has developed ballistic missiles that can reach the American mainland and it is equipping them with nuclear warheads and multiple warheads, which are hard to defend against. It will probably also deploy submarine-launched nuclear missiles. Japan will continually face the North Korean threat going forward, which will render the American nuclear umbrella meaningless. Therefore, Japan must think about nuclear armament. It should probably accomplish this while Trump is in power, since he said he would allow Japan and South Korea to have nuclear weapons (although it was a statement made during his campaign). For Japan to possess nuclear deterrence, the most realistic option is entering into a nuclear sharing arrangement with the U.S. The U.S. is already engaging in nuclear sharing with Germany and Italy – other “former enemy states” in the United Nations Charter. For instance, nuclear submarines equipped with nuclear missiles could be jointly operated by Japan and the U.S., and the authority to launch them would be transferred to Japan in the event of an emergency. To conclude such an arrangement, Japan must first abolish its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
　Some people are of the view that nuclear sharing falls under the individual right to self-defense, so there would be no need to amend the constitution. However, to effectively ensure Japan’s security, the constitution should be reformed to clearly stipulate the Japan Self-Defense Forces and recognize them as a constitutional military force, like Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed in May. Now is an opportunity for constitutional change, given that National Diet members in favor of this occupy two thirds of the seats in both houses. To start, the first and second clauses of Article 9 should be left as-is and a third clause added by 2020. This would rid the citizens of their fear of constitutional change. After, sufficient time could be taken to discuss and revise the entire constitution. Since Abe’s proposal in May, the media (which conspires with forces in favor of protecting the constitution) has bashed Abe, and as a result his approval rating plummeted. Still, more people are taking notice of real threats such as the recent North Korean hydrogen bomb test and ICBM launches over Japan, and Abe’s approval rating has recovered. Abe’s past strategy was to continue increasing his approval rating, submit a constitutional amendment motion by next summer, dissolve the Lower House afterwards, then simultaneously hold a national referendum and general election to achieve constitutional reform and a stable government. However, he has decided that this is the chance for an early-stage dissolution due to the increased potential of a limited American air strike (with advance notice) in response to North Korean provocation, as well as his overhead view of the political circumstances including Seiji Maehara being chosen as the representative of the Democratic Party, the series of people leaving the party, and the fact that Yuriko Koike’s new party has neither a name nor a specific platform. Abe believes that this dissolution would result in a ratio much larger than two thirds in favor of constitutional change. If constitutional reform is not carried out during the Abe administration, neither it nor nuclear sharing can be accomplished over the next 30 or 50 years. Over that time, Japan may be drawn into China’s sphere of influence and become one of its autonomous regions.
　Data on the diffusion rate of household fallout shelters indicates a percentage of just 0.02% in Japan; 82% in the U.S.; and 323.2% in Seoul, South Korea. Fallout shelters can also function as air-raid shelters. All of the residents of and tourists in Seoul could likely evacuate to shelters with 20 or 30 minutes of prior notice. Current predictions say it will be difficult to safeguard peace in East Asia, and Japan should work to increase its percentage of fallout shelters and protect the country from nuclear weapons as well as attacks by other countries, earthquakes, and tsunamis. Japan should also transform itself into a country capable of self-defense by taking another look at the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, amending the constitution, and entering into a nuclear sharing arrangement with the U.S. This is our chance, now that the North Korean threat is increasing.

September 16 (Saturday), 4:00 p.m.