Yoshiko Sakurai’s column, “For a Strong, Beautiful Nation,” is published in The Sankei Shimbun newspaper. The March 4 article was titled, “We Must Not be Nuclear Bystanders.” It read:
The term “strategic nuclear weapons” refers to nuclear arms used in direct attacks between countries, such as the U.S. and Russia, while putting their lives on the line. “Tactical nuclear weapons” are powerful weapons actually employed in battle. In Putin’s statement excerpted by Sakurai, his use of the phrase “strategic nuclear forces” seems to be a direct attempt to restrain the U.S. In addition, Russia and China are considering the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons to gain advantages in regional conflicts. When comparing these two types of arms, I think there is a much greater chance that tactical nuclear weapons will actually be employed.
Sakurai also quotes from Takahashi’s Outline of Modern Warfare. His analysis says we have reached the end of temporary international stability during the post-Cold War era, and that we have entered an age of competition between major powers, mainly the U.S. and China. The Cold War was a time of confrontation between democratic, capitalist nations against socialist powers. Capitalism won an overwhelming economic victory, but in terms of politics, China’s successful creation of state-led capitalism means democracy did not achieve an overwhelming victory over authoritarianism. In fact, increasing digital transformation (DX) has made it easier for authoritarian states that want to centrally control their citizens, leading to confrontation between these “digital authoritarian” nations versus countries implementing DX in a democratic fashion.
Takashi says another factor in Sino-American contention is geopolitical conflict over spheres of influence, which is the most important security issue facing Japan. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a geopolitical attempt to control China’s traditional “heartland.” It is also trying to change the status quo through regional pressure in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Taiwan. The East and South China Seas are a military “gray zone,” a place in between war and peace. Since the People’s Republic of China was established, its absolute mission has been to integrate Taiwan, resulting in a tense situation. It is highly likely that this gray zone could become the site of an actual conflict. Considering this context, Takahashi points out that a Sino-American conflict near Taiwan might develop into a large-scale war including nuclear weapons. From this we can surmise the risk of strategic nuclear weapons being used – not tactical nuclear weapons – and it is certainly no exaggeration to say that East Asia is the most dangerous region in the world today.
Sakurai continues her column by explaining that Japan should abandon its “bystander” attitude in the risky East Asian region. To oppose the Chinese and Russian threats, she says Japan should draft security policy as an involved party in the nuclear weapons issue. Particularly worthy of attention is the following portion, excerpted from Takahashi’s book:
Takahashi recommends the “net assessment” method for considering what a rival is doing and coming up with strategies for different actions. China’s East Asian military force is vastly more powerful than both the Japanese and American forces in that region. Of course, the U.S. excels in terms of overall fighting power, but its forces are spread around the globe with a mere portion of its military strength dedicated to Asia. By using the net assessment method, Takahashi writes that Japan should devote efforts to maintaining the current situation and discouraging China from changing the status quo. This asymmetry would provide advantages to Japan; namely, Japan could cause a deadlock by simply obstructing the Chinese military from crossing the ocean to Taiwan. In that case, the U.S. could focus its global fighting strength in East Asia. Japan must step up its defense spending to ensure sufficient fighting power to hinder the Chinese military according to the 3:1 rule. Defense expenditures of 10 trillion yen would equal 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP), a ratio of 1:2.1 with China, which fulfills the one-third requirement. The Fumio Kishida government announced in December 2022 its plan to raise defense spending to 2% of the GDP. Takahashi says this makes sense, and I agree as well.
Sakurai writes that Japan’s safety depends heavily on its alliance with the U.S. This is true, but I also believe a nation should defend itself, then ask its allies for assistance when necessary. According to a global public opinion poll conducted of men and women aged 18 and older in 79 countries, just 13.2% of Japanese respondents said they would fight for their country if a war broke out. This was the lowest ratio among the countries surveyed, and demonstrates the degree to which Japanese people have lost their awareness of defense. For instance, Vietnam was 96%, and even Lithuania (the second-lowest score) was 32.8%. The question is, what should we do?
This issue is explored in Tsuneyasu Takeda’s article from the April 2024 issue of Hanada magazine, “Now is an Appropriate Time to Discuss Conscription.” Takeda begins by analyzing the factors contributing to this low level of consciousness:
However, the global situation is changing in major ways. China is rapidly enhancing its fighting power, and has declared its intent to use military force if necessary to integrate Taiwan. Russia disregarded the United Nations Charter to invade Ukraine. How should Japan alter its mindset about defense in these circumstances? Takeda writes as follows:
Takeda says Japan takes applications from regular citizens who want to become reserve candidates, writing, “Those who pass the examination participate in 50 days of training over three years. When they complete this training, they become JSDF reserve officials who serve terms of three years, with five training days per year.”
Takeda states, “Then we would stand at the threshold to finally talking about defense and selecting from two choices: fighting, or not fighting.” This is one way of thinking, but I believe we could also change our mindset through education spanning all the way until university. Former Japan Air Self-Defense Force General Kunio Orita surveyed students taking his university class by asking them if they would fight. At first, just 15% responded that they would. But on the last day of class, that number jumped to 79%. Japan has renounced war, but that does not mean war has renounced Japan. We can inspire students to think differently by teaching them fundamental information about nations, citizenship, human rights, nuclear deterrence, the UN, and other security-related topics.
No military or security research is taking place in the Japanese academic world, which holds to the doctrine of extreme peace education. The Science Council of Japan once declared that it would not study military topics. We cannot hope to ensure peace just by praying for it. Young people must learn from extensive research about why war occurs and how to prevent it. For example, I think it would be ideal for them to start by reading books such as What Japanese People Should Know About the JSDF and Defense (TATSUMI PUBLISHING), written by the aforementioned Takahashi. I think now is the time for Japan to consider consistent security education, from compulsory schooling through high school and university.
March 14 (Thursday), 5:00 p.m.