The column “Analysis: Ukraine Crisis” appeared on page 7 of The Yomiuri Shimbun Morning Edition on May 6. This interview with Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was titled, “China is the Real Issue Facing Japan and the United States.” In it, Cooper says that Japan’s defense spending should be doubled:

　There is a global trend of countries increasing their defense spending. On April 25, Toyo Keizai Online posted an article by Keio University Faulty of Economics Professor Takero Doi, “Can Japan Increase its Defense Budget to 2% of the GDP?”

　The article emphasizes that Japan should focus on healthy finances so it can take advantage of enemy weaknesses in the financial realm, rather than simply raising defense spending to 2% for a larger budget. Doi states, “It is important that defense spending be of high quality to ensure truly effective defense capabilities.”

I would like to explain why we should rethink the exclusively defense-oriented policy. This policy was officially elucidated in 1970 in the first Defense of Japan whitepaper. It clearly stated that an exclusively defense-oriented policy would be the main idea of Japanese defense, and defined this as “the concept of abiding by the constitution with a focus on defending the nation.” At that time Japan was led by the Eisaku Sato Cabinet, and the international community was experiencing what is known as a “détente.” The biggest threat was the Soviet Union; China did not yet aspire to foreign expansion.
As defined, the exclusively defense-oriented policy does not include the concept of deterrence. Deterrence is the ability to make an enemy fear retribution for attacks, and is a vital part of defending a country’s territory. In the extreme sense, Japan has fully entrusted its deterrence to the U.S. The JSDF has been limited to considering minimum means to cope with attacks in a passive way, namely, to protect Japanese territory if it is attacked. We must recognize how that way of thinking was only acceptable in the Cold War era, when no one except the Soviet Union would try to challenge American military force.
The era has ended in which Japan and the U.S. can fully divide their roles by Japan functioning as a “shield” and the U.S. as a “spear.” Japan cannot make preemptive strikes because its national policy is exclusively defense oriented, but we must have our own deterrence rather than depending fully on the U.S. to give our enemies a sense that they should avoid attacking Japan due to the consequences that will result.

The capability to strike enemy bases is drawing a great deal of attention in Japan today. Many news reports covered this topic when the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) released its Joint Statement in January 2022. However, I am concerned that our discussions seem to focus solely on the concept of attacks. The ability to strike enemy bases refers to the capability to directly destroy an enemy’s ballistic missile launch site or other base. I feel the word “attack” inspires a negative reaction among many people. There is also the risk that discussions can wander off topic while questioning what constitutes an enemy base. Rather than talking about the ability to strike enemy bases, we have employed the term “counterstrike capability.”

Consider the example of ballistic missiles. North Korea possesses 200 of these missiles and China has even more mobile launch pads. It is likely impossible to detect and destroy all of these missiles before they are fired, even with technology such as Japanese and American intelligence satellites.
“Attacking” is generally more effective than “protecting,” and it is also more efficient as well. To defend the country we must fully block any potential enemy attacks. When waging an attack, we can take the initiative and select from an abundant range of options. Of course, attacking is a more effective use of funds as well. Our proposal states that Japan should promptly formulate policy premised on having counteroffensive abilities as part of our deterrence. These abilities encompass a series of systems including missile and other equipment, intelligence gathering about our neighbors, discernment used to set objectives, actual weapon launching, and evaluating whether weapons hit their marks. More precise and powerful counteroffensive capabilities can be achieved through Japanese-American cooperation. For instance, the 2+2 Joint Statement from January refers to “continuing discussion on proliferated low earth orbit satellite constellation.” We could strengthen our monitoring system for missiles and other weapons by coordinating with the U.S. to launch multiple small satellites. From my experience as a gunner in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Field Artillery, if Japan was the target of a missile attack, the enemy’s units in charge of various systems (such as launch pads and radar equipment) would remain near the launch site for some time to dismantle the equipment. It would be difficult to destroy the missile right before it was fired, but we would have the chance to destroy systems before they are dismantled. “Counteroffensive” actually refers to targeting enemy attack systems, facilities related to command and control functions, and the like. It would not be permissible for Japan to retaliate against another country’s capital city or civilian population.
North Korea has an extremely high level of attack capability, including ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. However, it is quite weak when it comes to national defense using radar systems or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). It has the SA-5 (SAM with a range of 200 to 250 kilometers), a radar detection system (with a range of 400 kilometers) to quickly detect enemy aircraft, and a fire-control system that can aim missiles (range of 200 to 250 kilometers). However, some reports say this equipment is not operated to its full capacity due to significant deterioration and electric power supply issues.
Japan should improve its interception capabilities with a comprehensive air defense system to discourage North Korea from attacking. It should also work with the U.S. to boost our counteroffensive abilities. In other words, this would provide deterrence against North Korea. Defending our territory is not enough – our interactions should take the enemy’s weak points into account.